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2 l.  iNTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Over  the  ten-year  period  1988-97,  the  European  Community  enacted  an  exte.nsnve 
package of teKecommmlicatnons RegisUation designed to enable Europe to respond to the 
challenges of rapidly evolving and converging technologies and the globalisation of the 
information economy. Adoption of  the package by the Council and European Parliament, 
in  line with Treaty objectives and the Community's obligations under the WTO/GATS. 
agreement  1, implied a radical restructuring of  national telecoms legislation and markets. 
This  is  the  fourth  in  a  series  of reports  on  the  status  of implementation  of the  EC 
regu Ia tory package. The exercise began in May 1997, with the purpose of informing the 
EU  institutions,  and  governments,  operators,  market  entrants  and  equipment 
manufacturers,  of progress  in  ensuring  transposition  and  application  of the  measures 
making up  the package. The report covers the whole package of EC telecommunications 
legislation  adopted  since  1987,  and  complements  sector-specific  reports  such  as  the 
Frequency Report, the forthcoming  Leased Lines Report,  and  the Report on Universal 
Service. 
The data taken  into account in  this report was  that avaD!abRe  unp  to  16 October 
19982•  Comments  received  from  Member States  on  An:mexes  ~ and 5  up  to  !G 
November 1998 have !been taken into account. 
The  Commission  reported  to  the  Council  and  Parliament  in  February  19983  that,  as 
regards  transposition,  a  further  examination  was  needed  only  of the  more  recent 
harmonisation directives, and that future assessments should concentrate on the effective 
application of  the measures transposing the package. 
This IFounrtDn Report on implementation concludes that 
).- the further progress made in relation to the more recent directives means that the bulk 
of the measll!res in  tltae  pac~age have been transJ!losed into l!llational  Hegnsnatu~n; 
>- national measures giving effect to the principal regulatory tntemes underpinning the 
· package  (national  regulatory  authorities,  licensing,  interconnection,  universal 
service,  tariffs,  numbering, frequency,  rights of  way) are being applne(jj  in practnce, 
although  there  are,  as  might  be  expected  with  an  exercise  of this  complexity,  a 
coqsiderable number of  details remaining to be resolved; 
~  dynamic teBecoms markets are evolving rapidly in the Member States. 
1 General agreement on trade in telecommunications services, entered into force 5 February 1998 
2  The  market  datn  in  Annex  I  relating  to  numbers  of operators,  licence  fees  and  interconnection 
agreements is  that received from the NRAs/Ministries up to September 1998; each table refers to  the 
date of validity of individual data. 
·  3  Third  report  on  the  implementation  of the  telecommunications  regulatory  package,  COM(98)80, 
http//www.ispo.cec.be/infosoc/telecompolicy; http//www/europa.eu.int/comm/dg4/lawliber/libera.htm 
3-These conclusions arc based on the following. inputs: 
As  regards  transposition,  the  Commission  has  carried  out  an  article-by-article 
exainination  of the  principal  provisions  in  the  directives,  and  assessed  the  level  of 
compliance on a scale indicating substantial, partial or non-transposition. 
The Commission's assessment of the extent to  which  nationally tran·sposed measoues 
are  being applied effectively in  the  Member States has  been made on the basis of an 
analysis of 
>- a  series  of indicators  of compliance  with  the  most  important  principles  and 
requirements of  the regulatory package 
)..- data showing the extent to which markets are effectively opening to competition.· 
The Commission's assessment of  effective compBiance is as follows: 
"  National regulatory authorities: Regulatory authorities have begun operations in 
all Member States, and arc cooperating and exchanging information on a systematic 
·basis with each other and with the Commission. While it is reasonable to expect that 
they will require time to become fully effective, all have begun to implement tDlle 
principles laid down in the regUJilatory package. 
There are, however, some concerns as to the sufficiency of  the powers and resources 
available to them, the degree of  separation from the body controlling the incumbent, 
and the clarity of  the division of  powers between the different bodies to which NRA 
tasks have heen devolved.  ' 
"  Licensing: The national fram·ewo~rlks in place appear to be functioning well, with 
large numbers of  new players authorised to enter the market; the procedures applied 
in practice conform broadly to the requirements of  the package. 
Concerns relate in particular to onerous licence conditions. lack of  transparency in 
regard to cdnditions and procedures, the level  of  fees and the length of  time required 
in certain cases to issue licences. 
' 
a  Interconnection: A significant number of interconnection agreements are already 
in place in the Community. There is evidence that interconnection charges are 
beginning to converge on best practice charges, thereby contributing to the level of 
service competition. 
There are concerns as to the excessive lengt~ of  negotiations, the scarcity of 
agreements in the fixed market, the inadequacy of  reference interconnection offers 
and the lack of  transparency relating to cost accounting systems. 
•  l111iversal service: Schemes for financing universal service have been set up in only 
a limited number of Member States. 
There is concern relating to the calculation of  the amount of  the contribution from 
market players. 
.  ' 
4 l!l  Tariffs/accounting systems: Tariff rebalancing has not been completed in a number 
ofMember States. 
The fact that tariffs are not sufficiently cost oriented produces anti-competitive effects 
in certain market segments and increases the cost burden on other sectors of  the 
economy. 
c  Numbering: Operators do not appear to be squeezed due to lack of  availability of 
numbers. Carrier selection is operating at least partially in most Member States, 
while number portability has been introduced ahead of  schedule in some ofthem. 
The incumbents in a  small minority of  Member States appear to exercise afi undue 
influence on the allocation of  numbers. 
c  Frequeucy: All Member States have issued at least two GSM and one DCS 1800 
licence. 
Concerns relate to the period required in some Member States for the phasing out of 
analogue systems. 
11  Rights of  way: Network operators are granted the right to use public ways in 
virtually all Member States. 
Practical problems appear to exist in several Member States with regard to the use of 
public ways and sea cables, and in a small number with regard to private land. 
hn  summary, there appear to be no areas in which significant failures have occurred in 
the practical application of  nationally transposed legislation, although corrective action is 
required on a number of  points in a number of  countries. 
This  assessment  is  reflected  in  the  state  of the  market'.  It is  estimated  that  the 
European  telecommunications  services  market  will  produce  total  revenues  of around 
ECU 148 billion in 1998, ECU 120 billion of which wiJJ be in the voice telephony and 
network service market and ECU 28 biiJion in mobi1es5. 
4 Fuller data are set out in Annex 1. 
5 Source: EITO (European Information Technology Observatory), 1998 
5 European telecommunications market value 
(1998, Ecu billion) 
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Overall, the telecommunications sector is  now widely regarded as  being the single most 
important contributor to  economic growth in the Union. In this contextthe Commission 
welcomes  the  decision  by  Ireland  to  bring  forward  the  dat~ of full  liberalisation  as 
evidence of  the benefits to markets of  the full adoption ofthe regulatory package. 
There have already been clear benefits to  users  and consumers. The most obvious has 
been  the  enormous  increase  in  the  number  of  providers  across  the  range  of 
telecommunications  services.  At  end  August  1998  there  were,  according  to  figures 
provided  by the  respective  NRAs,  218  operators  in  the  Union  with  authorisation  to 
provide national public voice telephony, excluding a large number which are authorised 
on the basis of  general legal  pr~visions. 
Number of operators authorised to offer 
national public voice telephony (August 1998) 
TOTAL EU: 218 
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As far as international voice services are concerned, 284 operators are authorised, while a 
total of77 national mobile licences have been granted. 
6 Number of operators authorised to offer 
international public voice telephony 
(August 1998) TOTAL EU: 284 
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The  network  services market has also been  thrown wide open:  526 operators are  now 
authorised  to  offer  local  network  services,  while  189  can  offer  network  services  at 
national level and 256 at international level. 
Number of operators authorised to offer national 
public network services  (August 1998) 
TOTAL EU: 189 
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Although for most Member States it is still too early to  see a significant decrease in the 
. market power of incumbents in the fixed  market, an analysis of the  liberalised mobile 
market  shows  clearly  that  the  market  power  of the  leading  operators  is  falling 
dramatically. 
7 Digital mobile market share for the leading 
operators (August 1998) 
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A further important benefit to users and consumers has been the overall decline in prices 
of  telecommunications  services6.  However,  in  view  in  particular  of the  need  to 
rebalance  tariffs  in  line  with  co~ts, some of the significant reductions  for  example in 
international business and residential tariffs are partly offset by rises in some countries in 
the cost of  national calls, in particular local calls, together with rental charges. 
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Leased line prices, however, both national and international, have shown significant falls. 
r,  Source: Eurodata Foundation, 1998 
8 Annual variation of national leased line basket charges 
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As  regards  the  comparison  of tariff levels  between Member States,  countries  with  a 
longer  experience  of liberalisation  in  particular  enjoy  significantly  lower  tariffs  for 
national business and residential calls. This picture is repeated for leased line tariffs over 
the range of  circuits offered. 
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Data is given in Annex  I relating to a range of indicators of market activity. Specific 
references to relevant data are made in the appropriate sections of  this Report. 
Given  the fact  that market restructuring following  liberalisation has barely begun,  it is 
premature to  attempt anything more than an  estimate of the impact of tlbe  process on 
employment. On  the one hand there will clearly be pressure on incumbents to increase 
efficiency as their tariffs and market shares are squeezed; on the other, the rapid rate of 
market entry, the expansion of services and the introduction of innovative technologies, 
in  large part driven by liberalisation and the single telecoms market, hold out the prospect 
of substantial  net  gains  in  employment  across  the  economy  as  a  whole.  Studies  are 
currently in hand, and early indicators are that the initial downturn in employment ih the· 
9 sector is  turning rouncF.  This forecast  is  supported by the estimated rate of growll:lh!  in 
the  n•:II.J  mob  iDe  mmrlkd  oa·  2 i.2(%  anndl  DUll  the nndworlk  services market of 13. 7%,  inn 
J998K. 
Proposals for action 
The Member States have adopted an extensive legislative framework for the creation of a 
fully  liberalised,  single  European  telecommunications  market.  At  this  stage  the 
Commission has identified no major obstacles to  the full  realisation of that objective in 
practice.  Given  the  magnitude  of the  task  and  the  pressure  on  time  and  resources, 
however; there are inevitably a number of shortcomings, on which this Report focuses in 
considerable detail. The Commissionn urges Member ~tates to 
~  Complete the transposition of the remaining measures not yet incorporated into 
national legislation 
).-- Ensure that nationaD regulatory aut!wrfities are fully resourced and equipped!, and 
have the necessary degree of independennce from the incumbent, to deal  with the 
problems of practical application highlighted in this Report 
).- Continue the constructive cooperation with the Commission which has contributed 
to the progress achieved to date.  -
The Commission will itself continue to  follow the situation closely, in accordance with 
its  Treaty  obligations.  It will  in  particular  pursue  the  84  infringement  proceedings 
currently open in respect of the regulatory package (30 relating to the liberalisation and 
54 to the harmonisation directives), and ·open new proceedings where appropriate. 
A fuller overview of this report can be obtained by referring to t;he boxes setting out, for 
each theme, the broad conclusions reached. These are in tum based on the more detailed 
material in Annexes 1 (market data) and 4 (analysis by theme/Member State). 
2.  THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION TEN MONTHS AFTER FULL LIBERALISATION 
2.1.  Scope 
The directives and decisions covered by the report are listed in Annex 2. 
Derogations  have  been  granted  to  certain  Member  States  with  very  small  or  less 
~eve  loped networks9 by decision of the Commission from certain of the requirements of 
, 7  See  also  "Job  opportunities  in  the  Information  Society  - exploring  the  potential of the  information 
revolution"- Report from the Commission to the European Council 
X Source: EITO (European Information Technology Observatory), 1998 
'1 Luxembourg:  1 July  1998;  Spain:  1 December 199S; Ireland:  I January 2000; Portugal:  1 January 2000; 
Greece: 31  December 2000. 
10 lhc  Article  90  directives,  principally  as  regards  the  libcralisation  of voice  telephony 
services (ami  unclcrlying network) and alternative infrastructure. This should be home in 
mind in  relation to certain or  the indicators and assessments contained in this report. 
2.2.  Methodology 
In  making  its  assessments,  the  Commission  has  relied  on  a  number. of sources  of 
information,  principally  questionnaires  to  the  fifteen  national  regulatory  authorities; 
audits1o  carried  out  by  independent  legal  and  economic  experts  working  under  the 
direction  of the  Commission  services  responsible;  formal  and  informal  complaints 
received  in,  connection  with  the  transposition  and  application  of  the  regulatory 
framework;  reports  from  market  players  in  the  context of the  ongoing  contacts  and 
exchanges of  views which the Commission conducts with the industry; and consultations 
with the Member States in relation to this report. 
2.3.  State of implementation 
Article  155 of the EC Treaty places on the Commission an obligation to "ensure that the 
provisions of the Treaty and the measures taken by the institutions pursuant thereto arc 
applied".  As stated  in  the Third Communication on  implementation, the Commission's 
task,  in  the light of this obligation, is not only to  ensure the trans!Posntnmn  but, equally 
important,  the  effective  applfication  of the  national  rules  adopted  pursuant  to  the 
directives. Transposition means the incorporation into national law of the obligations set 
out  in  the  directives  concerned  in  order  to  achieve  the  objectives  pursued.  The 
Commission's view,  in  line  with  the  case  law  of the  Court of Justice11  is  that  muly 
coned transposition  p~rovides Begal  certainty to marlket  playe~rs as to then1r  rnghts 
11.mdler the EC legislation. However, the Commission has always been equally clear that 
full  implementation of Member States' obligations under the legislation can be achieved 
only with the fuln and effective appDication of the natnonal tJraunspositimn  measures. 
2.3.1.  Transposition 
In  the Third Communication the Commission gave an overview of  the transposition of  all 
of the  directives  making  up  the  regulatory package,  and  concluded  that  the  necessary 
national measures were "very D<n~rgcly in  place in  most Member States"12. There were, 
however,  gaps  in  the  transposition  of two  directives  (Licensing,  Interconnection)  for 
which  the deadline for the adoption of  national  measures was 31  December 1997, the 
eve of the date for full  liberalisation. The Commission has therefore carried out a further 
assessment of the transposition of those directives, together with two further important 
directives,  that  IS,  the  amended  Leased  Lines  and  the  revised  Voice  Telephony 
Directives. 
Annex 3 gives an overview of their transposition, in which the Commission has applied 
the same methodology as that used in the Third  Communication.  Three categories of 
10 Audits/studies were carried out April-October 1998. 
II See, for example, case 239/85, ECR 1986, p 3645; case 363/85, ECR 1987, p 1740 
12 Sec Annexes I (libcralisation directives) and II (harmonisation directives) to the Third Communication. 
11 assessment  are  therefore  given,  "substantially  transposed",  "partially  transposed"  and 
"not transposed",  based  on  the  extent  to  which the  lk.ey  §llll"Kllllcfiples  laid  down  in  the 
directives concemed are transposed. 
1The Commission's assessment of the  current  state of transposition of the  outstanding 
harmonisation directives is as follows: 
'Y  ILDcensnng  llJlnrective  - Significant  progress  has  been  made  with  the  adoption  of 
secondary  legislation  in  Spann  and  IreDandl  and  primary  legislation  in  the 
Netlllerhnnds.  JEfiglhlt  Membell"  States  have  transposed  substantially  (lDlenmarlk, 
Germalllly, Spafillll, Ireland, lP'ortungal, lFinhmdl, Swedlen, United Kingdlom), while a 
further six (JBeDgiunm,  JF'ra1111ce,  Italy, Lmiemll>ounrg, tllne  Netherlands, Aunstrfia)  have 
transposed partially.  Greece has not yet notified transposition measures.  Secondary 
legislation is expected in Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
'Y  UDlltercmmectimn  Jl)ill"ednve- Significant progress has been made by Spann and lllaly 
with  the  adoption. of secondary  legislation.  Nnlllle  ~emlber States have transposed 
substantially  (IDlellllmawlk,  Germa1111y,  Spahn,  llreDand,  Italy,  the  NdUnerDands,. 
Austria,  lF'nnBalllld,  United  Killllg<llom),  while  a  further  founr  (Belgiunm,  lFramce, 
Luxembourg, Swed.ellll)  have transposed partially. Greece and Portugal have not yet 
notified  transposition  measures.  Secondary  legislation  is  expected  in  Belgium, 
Gre~ce, the Netherlands, and Portugal, and primary legislation in Sweden. 
J;- Amended Leased Lines Directive - Measures substantially transposing the directive 
have  been  norified ·by  Denmark,  Germany,  Spain, Ireland,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands, Austria, Finland and the United Kingdom. Belgium has transposed 
partially.  Greece,  France,  Italy,  Portugal·  and  Sweden  have  not· yet  notified 
transposition measures. 
)..- Revised  Voice  Telephony  Directive  - Measures  substantially  transposing  the 
directive  have  been  notified  by  Denma~rk, Germany,  Spain,  Finland  and  the 
United  Kirngdom.  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Austria  and  Portugal 
have transposed partially.  Greece, France,  Ireland,  Italy  and  Sweden have not yet 
·notified transposition measures.  · 
As  rega~rds the wDnole  package of harmonisatnon and liberalisation  ~irectives, the 
Commission notes that the further progress made in relation to the most recent directives 
complements its assessment  in  the Third' Report that transposed measures are very 
largely in place in most Member States. 
The  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  the  full  transposition  and  pursue  the 
infringement proceedings opened in respect of  the gaps referred to above. 
2.3.2.  Effective application 
The  Commission  now  regards  the  task  of securing  the  effective  application  of the 
national rules adopted pursuant to  the directives as being its major priority. For market 
·players, and new entrants in particular, this is a matter of overriding concern, since 
their  survival  or otherwise  in  the  market  place  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  the _ 
principles taken over from the directives are applied in practice. 
12 While  transpos1t1on  can  he  judged  against  clear  criteria  by  comparing  the  relevant 
national  measures  with  the  texts  of the  directives,  the  assessment  of the  effective 
application of those measures depends to a much greater extent on the indicators selected 
and on the Commission's judgment, taking inter account inter alia that of  market players, 
as  to  compliance.  In  the  final  analysis,  it  will  be  for  the  Commission  to  test  those 
judgments where  necessary  before  the  Court of Justice  in  proceedings brought under 
Article 169 of the Treaty. In this context the Court hru~ given a clear indication that "the 
Commission's function,  in the general interest of the Community, is to  ensure that the 
Member States give effect to the Treaty and the provisions adopted by the institutions 
thereunder... It may therefore ask the Court to  find  that,  in not having achieved,  in a 
speci fie  case, the result intended by the directive, a Member State has failed to fulfil  its 
obligations"IJ. 
As  stated  in  the  first  Communication  on  implementation,  the  telecoms  package  has 
evolved over a period of years in the light of political and technological change.  The 
result· is  that many of the major liberalisation and  harmonisation principles are  spread 
over a number of  directives and decisions and several legal bases. 
For the purpose of  assessing effective application, therefore, this report presents 
).- A short analysis of each of the major tlnemes fin  tii:J.e  package, together with a set of 
imlllcatou-s of comp,iance which a1re intenulled to serve as a reference point forr the 
assessment in this and any future reports; 
).- An overview of  the effectov.e applicatiorn in the Community of  the regulation relating 
to  those themes is  then  given,  with a more detailed country-by-country analysis in 
Annex 4; the focus here is on remaining barriers to the creation of  a single, liberalised 
European telecommunications market resulting from failure to give full effect to the 
principles of  the package. 
Given that the prime objective of the legislative package is  to  open national markets on 
the basis of  a harmonised regulatory framework, a link is also made where appropriate to 
the market indicators set out in Annex 1. 
In assessing effective application, the Commission has borne in  mind that certain of the 
principles in  the directives do not lend themselves easily to transposition, but require a 
direct examination of  their practical application. The requirement in the Interconnection 
Directive,  for  example,  that  Member  States  "shall  ensure  the  provision  Of adequate 
numbers" is most usefully assessed  in its  practical implementation.  Further,  and most 
crucially, in some circumstances a faithful transposition into national law may in practice 
be applied in a way which is contrary to  the intention of  the Community legislator, or 
may simply be a dead letter; the "practical application" test is also intended to deal with 
those cases. 
IJ  Case 431192, ECR 1995, pI, grounds 21,22 
13 There is a further potential barrier to market entry which has been cited by market players 
in  connection with a number of the themes set out here, namely the complexity and in 
·some  cases  obscurity  of national  implementing  regulation.  The  Commission  urges 
Member States to review rules and procedures where appropriate, to ensure the greatest 
possible clarity and ease of  application. .  · 
2.4;  Effective application - results by theme 
The indicators in this section represent the criteria used by the Commission in examining . 
the effective application of the salient aspects of each  theme.  The concern  underlying 
each question is in essence "'Does the way nn  which  nation~l law is applied in practice 
meet the objectnves of the regulatory package? In particular does  nt  discriminate 
against different market players, especially new entrants?" 
2.4.1.  National regulatory authorities (NRAs) 
EC  framework 
Much  of the  implementation  of the  telecoms  package  is  delegated  to  the  national 
regulatory authorities. The existence of  regulatory bodies equipped to carry out the tasks 
assigned under the directives is therefore the first reference point in any assessment of  the 
effective application of  the package. 
The principal requirements arc laid down in  the Services and Framework Directives. The 
first  is  the legal and functional independence of the NRA from network operators and 
service/equipment providers. Effective independence in  this sense may be' prejudiced in 
particular by 'regulatory capture', where NRA personnel are too closely influenced by 
the incumbent or the interests of  other operators. 
Indicators: Are staff  seconded from operators/equipment providers to the NRA? Is 
there a  'revolving door' between the NRA and the incumbent as regards staff? 
The same directives also  impose separation of the control and regulatory function 
where Member States retain ownership or significant control of the incumbent. Effective 
structural separation between the. Ministry/department responsible for the holding by the 
State  in  the incumbent and  the different bodies to  which the NRA's tasks have been 
devolved can be achieved in a number of  ways, depending on the legal and administrative 
structure in a Member State. 
Indicators:  Do  the structures  in  place ensure  that  regulatory  decisions  are  not 
influenced hy ownership considerations? Do officials from the bodies to which NRA 
task<;  have been assigned participate directly or indirectly in the management of  the 
incumbent, or vice versa? 
The  harmonisation directives  also  lay down powers to  be devolved to NRAs relating 
principa11y  to  !kensing (in  particular supervision of the  licensing  procedure  and  the · 
amendment  and  withdrawal  of licences);  interconnection (in particular the power to 
supervise the reference interconnection offer (RIO)  and the implementation of suitable 
cost accounting systems and to secure interconnection and resolve disputes); leased lines 
(in particular supervision of  refusal, intem1ption o~ reduction of  availability arid ensuring 
14 application of  the non-discrimination principle); universal sennce (in particular ensuring 
affordability and monitoring any financing scheme); and tarnffs (in particular supervision 
of the application of  the principle of  cost-orientation for voice telephony and leased lines 
and  the  implementation  of suitable  cost  accounting  systems).  Further  powers  are 
devolved relating to numbering, frequencies and rights of way. An indication of the 
effective exercise of these powers is the number of decisions taken. Further, in order to 
be able to exercise its powers the NRA must be sufficiently resourced. 
Indicators:  Is  the  number of interventions  by the  NRA  proportionate to  market 
activity? Are the NRA 's  powers exercised effectively in  all areas of  competence? 
Does the NRA exercise its powers of  initiative? Is the NRA  sufficiently resourced to 
enable it to act? 
NRAs- effective application in the Member States- overview 
ReguBatorry authorities are established in all Member States, and are cooperating and 
exchanging information on a systematic basis with each other and with the Commission. 
Given the complex nature of  their tasks, the difficulty of  attracting qualified staff:. and the 
lack of  adequate financial support in some Member States, it is reasonable to expect that 
they  will  require  time  to  become  fully  effective.  All  have,  nonetheless,  begun  to 
impiement the pirincfiples laud  down in  tilDe  l!'egulatory paclkage. There are,  however, 
some concerns. 
In  several  Member States the  regulatory  functions  are  allocated both to the' Ministry 
responsible for  the telecommunications sector and  to  a separate administrative body. In 
mosl  cases  the  Ministry  acts  as  the  policy  maker  and  the  administrative  bodies  are 
responsible for supervising the market. in certai!l] cases there ds  a llaclk of cRardty  as to 
the actual divisio!l] of powers between the different bodies to whficllll NJRA taslks lllave 
heeJD  dlcvoKved (the Netherlands,  Austria). 
In some Member States concerns are reported that the strudul!"es R!l]  pfiace dlo  llllOt  ellllSllnJre 
that B"egwnatory  dedsiolllls  are not hd'Uuelllced  ~y State owHDell"ship  coHDsidle~ra11:iollls. In 
these cases, the necessary separation of the control of the incumbent and the regulatory 
powers should be re-examined (Belgium, Finland, Luxembourg, Ireland, France). 
There  is  concern  relating  to  Iimitatiolllls  on  staff  !I]Umlbell"s  (Belgium,  Greece, 
Luxembourg; Italy, where the NRA is newly-established), thus jeopardising the ability of 
the NRA to address all the relevant issues. In France there are grounds to believe this is 
the case for l~censing and tariff controls. In certain non-derogation Member States, some 
new entrants have reported what is perceived as a certain lack of proacti.vnty  (Denmark, 
France, the Netherlands, and Sweden). JLegal uncertainty has been created in Italy due 
to the late establishment of the NRA. In some Member States staff are secmrndedl from 
the openuto1rs  to the NRA (Greece,  Portugal)  or from  the  Ministry representing  the 
state's shareholding (Ireland), creating concern as to the level ofindepende~ce. 
In certain cases the NRA does llllot  Oil]  reDatiollll  to R!l]tercommectnmn lllave s1lllffncne!l]t power 
to D!l]tervel!lle  Ollll  fits  OW!I]  D!l]itiatnve  (Luxembourg), or the power is  not specific enough 
(Germany), or HIII11:erestedl  pal!"11:8es  «:allllllllot  request fit  to finterveiiDe  (the Netherlands). In 
one case (Portugal), insufficient transposition of some directives creates uncertainty as to 
the powers granted to the NRA. In another (Belgium) there is concern that the NRA lacks 
competence to resolve interconnection disputes. 
15 2.4.2.  Licensing 
ECframework 
The  common  framework  for  granting  authorisations  for  the  provision  of 
telecommunications services is  laid  down in  the Services and Licensing Directives and  .  . 
the S-PCS Decision. The Services Directive lays down principles relating to restrictions 
on the number of licences and to procedures, fees, essential requirements and appeals. 
The  Licensing Directive supplements this  framework  with  harmonised criteria for  the 
issue  of general  authorisations,  possibly ·supplemented  by  individual  licences  in 
strictly defined circumstances. 
Indicators:  Where  general  authorisations  are  put  in  place,  are  procedures 
considered to he too cumbersome? Are fees for general authorisations seen as  a 
deterrent to market entry'! 
Individual licences should be required only for the provision of public voice telephony 
services  o~ public networks, or for purposes involving access to  scarce resources or the 
imposition of  obligations relating to universal service or competition safeguards. 
Where  national  licensing  schemes require  individual  licences  to  be  issued,  conditions 
may be attached relating to essential and public interest requirements, but must be limited 
to those listed in the directive. 
Indicators:  Is  excessive  reliance  placed  on  in.dividual  licensing  schemes? ·Are 
additional conditions imposed which are not in  conformity with  the Annex to  the 
Licensing Directive? Are onerous conditions imposed under the guise of  conditions 
permitted  under the  Licensing  Directive,  relating  eg  to  network  configuration 
(number of interconnection points)?  Are licence  conditions published in  a form 
'  which is not only accessible but which also gives the fullest possible information? 
Is there discrimination between different kinds of  operator which is not justified by 
objective criteria?  Is there discrimination between operators within ·the same class 
of  licence? Is there discrimination in practice against operators from other States? 
Procedures  must  be  published  in  accessible  forrn,  be  open,  non~discriminatory, 
iransparent, and 1ay down maximum time-limits. 
Indicators: Are the time-limits laid down  in  the national legislation  exceeded in 
practice,  and  are  there  sanctions/rights pf recourse  in  that ·event?  Are  there 
"hidden., delays in  issuing licences (resulting for example from repeated requests 
for  supplementary  information)?  Is  the·  application  assessment  procedure 
transparent? 
Operators ·which  fulfil  the  conditions  laid  down  and  published  should  be  entitled  to 
receive a licence. 
Indicator: Numbers of  licences issued or refused. 
Measures may be laid down to ensure compliance with the licensing conditions. 
16 Limitations  on  number  of licellllces  may  relate  only  to  the  efficient  use  of radio 
frequency or the need to make numbers available, in conformity with Community law. 
Indicator: Are other grounds used in practice as a means of  restricting the issue of 
licences? 
Fees  should  seek only to  cover the administrative costs  incurred  in  administering the 
licence in question, and must be proportionate to the work involved. They may reflect the 
need to ensure the optimal use of  scarce resources. 
Indicators: Are  fees perceived in the market as a deterrent to market entty? Are  fees 
considered  as  reflecting  the  administrative  costs  incurred  in  their  issuance, 
management, supervision and enforcement? 
I Licensing- effective application in the Member States- overview 
The  regulatory  framework  for.  licences  appears  largely  to  be  in  place  across  the 
Community, taking into  account the  varying  degrees  of transposition  in  the  Member 
States and the existence of  temporary schemes in some Member States. 
The various national frameworks appear -in broad terms to function well, and do not rely 
too heavily on individual licences, with all Member States entber reqfi&nJring  indlnvidW!all 
licences for one or very few  servnces, or reqWiirii!Bg  inrlUvidtnal  licei!Dces  mllfty  [or the 
services  mentioned  iftll  ~he  Licenshig  Directive.  Concerns  relating  to  effective 
application appear to exist mainly with regard to licence co:rndfr~iom; imposed (Belgium, 
Spain, France,  Italy),  a certain !ack of t:ralllsparency with regard  to  licence conditions 
(Ireland), the BeveU  of Dicence  fees  (Germany, France, although it should be pointed out 
that there are large numbers of operators in the market; Luxembourg and Italy as regards 
mobile),  and  time-Himits  for  the  ossue  of licences  (Belgium,  Greece,  France,  Italy, 
Luxembourg). In some countries (Belgium, Spain, Italy, Austria) there are concerns with 
regard to  He111gthy or cumbersome Bicence procedures. In one country there are concerns 
regarding limittaltnoftlls  on the m.umbe:r of lkences or fadlure to grarrnt licences with full 
rights (Greece), and in another (Belgium), the licences granted are only provisional. 
Some countries have  recently  amended or completed the  licensing  framework  (Spain, 
Ireland), or are in the process (Luxembourg, the Netherlands), and it is therefore too early 
to see the full practical application of  the new licensing regimes. 
For a  comparative overview of the leveD  of licence' fees  in the Member States, see 
Annex 1, section 3. 
2.4.3.  Interconnection I special access 
The common framework on interconnection and special access is set out in the Services, 
Interconnection  and  Voice  Telephony  Directives,  and  aims  to  develop  open  and 
competitive markets by  ensuring  fair,  proportionate and  non-discriminatory conditions 
for  interconnection  and  interoperability  of  networks  and  services  throughout  the 
Commun"ity. 
17 The Services, Mobile· and yull Competition Directives required tl1e  lifting of restrictions 
on direct interconnection between mobile networks, between mobile and fixed networks, 
and between fixed  networks, including across borders, and laid down principles relating 
to  the  non-discriminatory,  proportional  and  transparent  terms  on  which  incumbents 
should  provide interconnection,  the  cost-orientation of tariffs,  the publication of terms 
and  conditions,  and  the  requirement  to  implement. a  suitable  cost-accounting  system 
idcnti fying the cost elements relevant for pricing interconnection. 
The  Interconnection  and  Voice  Telephony  Directives  laid  down  the  principle  that 
interconnection and special  access should normally be left to commercial  negotiations 
between parties, while imposing a certain number of detailed obligations on operators 
notified  by  Member States as  having significant market power (SMP) on a relevant 
market.  These  are  inter  alia  the  obligation  to  meet  all  reasonable  requests  for 
interconnection  and  special  access,  respect  the  principle  of non-discrimination  in 
particular between  subsidiaries  or  internal  services  and  other _parties,  provide  suitable 
information to  other parties, communicate interconnection agreements to the NRA, and 
make  restricted  usc  of the  information provided  f~r intercoimection  purposes  by third 
parties. 
Further, categories of  operators with rights and obligations to negotiate interconnection 
are identified; the list of operators notified by each Member State has been published by 
the Commission. 
Indicators:  Do  new  entrants  face  problems  in  negotiating  and  obtaining 
interconnection,  in  particular as  regards  delays  in  negotiations  and delivery  of 
interconnection services? Are there any known  and unjustified cases of  refusal to 
interconnect, in particular in the case of  cross-border interconnection? 
As regards the level of charges for interconnection and special access, Community law 
docs not impose the usc of a specific costing model. However, in its Recommendation on 
Interconnection Pricing, the Commission points to the use of the LRAIC1 4 rhode!  for call 
tcrn1ination and sets out a list of "best current practi_cc"  interconnection charges that should 
apply  until  such time as  interconnection prices can  be properly calculated on the basis of 
LRAIC.  NRAs  have  the  discretion  to  require  the  retrqspective  adjustment  of 
inter:conncction charges, and require accountingjustification for interconnection charges set 
by  operators  subject  to  cost-orientation  obligations.  A  suitable  accounting  system  and 
accounting separation must also  be  in  place to  ensure that these pricing obligations- are 
observed. 
Indicator:  Do new  entrants  consider the  interconnection  tariffs proposed by  the 
incumbent as a barrier to entry on the market? 
Operators which have been, notified as having SMP on a relevant market must  publish -a 
reference  interconnection  offer  (RIO)  which  must  include  a  description· of the 
interconnection offering, in tum broken down into components according to market needs 
(and the associated terms and conditions, including charges). 
14  Long nHJ average incremental co~t 
18 Indicators: Has a RIO been published,  and approved by the NRA  ?  Does it cater 
for  the  new  entrants'  specific  needs  ?  Arc  the  services  offered  sufficicntfv 
unlmndled'! · 
lntercmmection- effective application in the Member States- overview 
One Member State (Portugal) has not notified to the Commission a list of opuators with 
significant market power. Belgium, Germany, Spain, France and the Netherlands have 
not done so for mobile operators. 
Interconnection negotiations are reported by new entrants to have an excessive duration 
in  a number of Member States (Belgium, Germany, France, and Austria) or are refused or 
deferred  because  the  incumbent  requires  the  other party  to  have  a  licence  (Italy  and 
Luxembourg)  or are  delayed  because  negotiations  involve  difficult  issues  (bottleneck 
resources in Denmark or local interconnection in Sweden). In some cases these problems 
raise the question whether NRAs are  using their powers to  a sufficient extent.  In one 
country (Luxembourg) the NRA has limited powers to  fix  time-limits for negotiations, 
and in another (Germany) insufficiently specified powers. 
With  the  exception  of Denmark,  Germany,  France,  Finland,  Sweden  and  the  United 
Kingdom, the number of agreements is limited and the existing agreements are with or 
between mobile oper'ators,  while very  few  agreements have been concluded with new 
entrants on the fixed market. 
The  existence of substantial  interconnection  disputes has  been  reported  iti  Denmark, 
Germany, Austria, Sweden  an~ the United Kingdom, as well as in  Greece. In  Germany, 
the  NRA  is  currently addressing the  problem of the  number of interconnection points 
imposed by the incumbent. 
Reference  interconnection  offers  have  been  published  in  all  of the  Member  States 
except Greece and  Portugal, although in  the first case a proposal has been made by the 
incumbent to  the NRA.  In  Germany, most of the  terms and conditions are considered 
confidential and, therefore, not in line with the objective of having an RIO published to 
provide transparency in the market.  In Luxembourg the RIO has been approved by the 
NRA, but has not yet been published. The completeness and/or adequacy in  accordance 
with market needs of  the RIO or draft RIO are the subject of  criticism by market entrants 
in  Germany,  Greece,  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg  and  Austria.  The RIOs  in  Italy  and 
Ireland have not yet been approved by the NRA and may be modified substantially. The 
proposals  lodged  by  the  incumbent  in  Greece  and  Austria  are  being  assessed  by the 
respective NRAs. 
In  Germany, France and  United Kingdom interconnection charges do not deviate at any 
interconnection level from the 1998 "best current practice" range as recommended by the 
Commission.  For  the  most  common  type  of  interconnection  - single  transit 
(metropolitan)  level  - only five  Member  States  are  above  the  "best current practice'' 
(Belgium,  Ireland, -Italy,  Luxembourg,  Portugal),  but,  in  Ireland  and  Italy,  the  current 
interconnection charges are those proposed by the incumbent operator and have not been 
formally approved by the NRA (in Italy the NRA is in the process of imposing changes 
to bring the charges into line with best current practice). With regard to interconnection at 
19 local  level,  Greece,  Spain,  Austria  and  Finland  have  not  set  up  local  tariffs  and 
interconnecting operators in  the  first  three  countries  have to  pay the  higher  tariffs  of 
single  transit.  Indeed,  the  tariffs  at  local  level  provided by Italy,  the  Netherlands  and 
Portugal  are  above  the  best  practice.  Finally,  with  regard  to  double  transit  (national) 
level,  a number of Member States are  still  above the "best practice" (Belgium,  Spain, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Finland). 
Only  the  United  Kingdom  has  made  available  on  request  a  description  of the  cost 
accounting system in  relation  to  interconnection,  showing the main  categories  under 
which costs are grouped and the rules used for the allocation of  costs to interconneCtion. 
For an overview of the number of interconnection agreements in place and the level· 
of interconnection charges, including the deviation from best current practice, see 
Annex 1, section 4. 
2.4.4.  Universal service 
The  framework  for  the  provision  of universal  service  is  based  on  the  principles  of 
affordability for the user and the sharing of costs among market players where  unive~sa1 
service  is  considered  to  be  an  unfair  burden  on  the  universal  service  provider  or 
providers. While the scope of universal service and general principles are laid down at 
Community  level,  it  is  left  to  Member  States  to  determine  the  mechanism  for  the 
provision of universal service and to define affordability: 
The ·Interconnection  and  revised  Voice  Telephony  Directives  define  the  scope, of 
universal service,  which  currently  covers  a connection  to  the  fixed  public  telephone'· 
network at a fixed location, capable of  supporting fax and data, and access to fixed public 
telephone services (i.e.  the  voice telephony service, access to  emergency 112 services, 
provision  of operator  assistance),  directory  services?' public  pay  phones,  and  specific 
measures,  where  appropriate,  for  disabled  users  and  users  with  special  social  needs. 
Member States may, in addition to the current harmonised set of services, impose further 
public  service  requirements;  these  may  not,  however,  be  financed  from  mandatory 
contributions by market players. 
The concept of  affordability applies in particular in respect of  users in rural or high  cost 
areas  and  vulnerable  groups  such  as  the  elderly,  those with  disabilities  or those  ~ith 
special  social  needs,  allowing  Member  States  to  implement  geographical  averaging, 
price-cap mech~nisms or other similar schemes such as targeted tariff schemes (e.g. low 
user schemes), until such time as  competition provides effective price control (see also. 
2.4.5). 
Where the I!Det  cost of universal service obligations represents an unfair burden on the 
organisation  providing  universal  service,  the  Services  and  Interconnection  Directives 
provide that it may be shared'amongst other market players, with accounting obligations 
placed on universal service operators (see also 2.4.5). There is, however, no obligation on 
Member States to set up such schemes. Given that financing schemes must be consistent 
with  certain  basic· Community  policy  aims,  the  following  indicators  are  particularly 
relevant: 
20 indicators: Are schemes  based on  of<jective.  transparent,  proportional and non-
discriminatory criteria? In particular, is the methodology of  calculation of  net cost 
s1!{jicient~y transparent ? 
Are the administrative burdens and related costs kept to a minimum ? 
Is  the  principle  of  neutrality  of  treatment  (e.g.  as  between  market 
players/technologies  or  between  integrated  or  unbundled provision  of services) 
respected? 
Universal service- effective application in the Member States- overview 
The great majority of Member States do not currently apply a mechanism for financing 
universal service. France is the only country which has implemented a universal service 
financing  mechanism  on  the  basis  of which  new  entrants  are  already  required  to 
contribute. In  Italy a fund  has been created which will be applied in  1999 on the basis of 
operators' results for  1998.  In  both countries, the methodology for calculating the net 
cost is of  concern. 
In two countries with contingent financing schemes there is concern as to the amount of 
the possible future contribution (Ireland) and  as to the methodology for calculating 
costs (Belgium). 
2.4.5.  Tariffs I accounting systems 
The ONP Framework Directive provides that telecommunications tariffs in  the Member 
States must be based on objective criteria,  g~arantee non-discrimination and  equality of 
treatment, be transparent, and must, in the case of SMP operators, be cost-oriented and 
sufficiently unbundled. 
Any  charge  for  access  to  network  resources  or  services  must  also  comply  with  the 
competition rules of the Treaty and should take into account the need to apportion fairly 
the  overall  cost  of .the  resources  and  the  need  for  a  reasonable  level  of return  of 
investment. 
2.4.5.1.  PSTN retail tariffs/tariff re-balancing 
Under  the  Full  Competition Directive,  Member States  were required  to  phase  out as 
rapidly  as  possible  all  unjustified  res,trictions  on  tariff re-balalllcing,  while  allowing 
speci fie  market conditions and the need to ensure the affordability of a universal service 
to be taken into account. 
Since re-balancing could make certain telephone services less, affordable in the short term 
for certain groups of users, Member States were permitted to adopt special provisions to 
soften the impact. However, where such re-balancing was not scheduled to be completed 
before  I January  1998, the Member  S~ates concerned had to  notify the Commission of 
21 the  ruturc  phasing  out  or remaining  tariff imbalances,  with  a  detailed  timetable  for 
i  mplcmcntation. 
Although under the revised Voice Telephony Directive, tariffs for use of the fixed public 
telephone  network  and  fixed  public  telephone  service  applied  by  operators  with 
significant marJ<et ·power on the relevant markets are required to  follow the principle of 
cost  orientation,  NRAs  are  allowed  to  impose  tariff constraints  relating  to  universal 
service objectives. 
Indicators:  Are ·any  specific  przcmg  constraints  imposed?  Are  appropriate 
measures  taken  to  maintain  the  affordability  of services  within  the  scope  of 
universal service for all users  (e.g.  price caps,  targ~ted tariff schemes,  etc.)? Are 
PSTN tariffs cost oriented/fully re-balanced ? 
2.4.5.2.  Leased line tariffs 
Under the amended Leased Lines Directive, organisations with significant market power 
in  respect of a specific leased-line offering in  a specific geographical area must ensure 
that tariffs are cost-oriented and transparent. They must, moreover, be independent of  the 
type  of application,  and  non~discriminatory. Where  other tariff elements  are  applied, 
these must be transparent and based on objective criteria. 
2.4.5.3.  Accounting systems/accounting separation 
In  order to enforce the tariff principles set out in the regulatory framework, NRAs must 
ensure  that  the  cost  accounting  systems  adopted  by operators  are  implemented  in  a 
transparent way and show the main categories under which costs are grouped, together 
with  the  rules  used  for  the  allocation  of costs,· in  particular  with  regard  to  the  fair 
attribution of  joint and common costs. 
Accounting separation is imposed in particular under 
r  the Cable Directive, to prevent discriminatory behaviour where an operator having an 
exclusive  right  to  provide  public  telecommunications  network  infrastructure  also 
provides cable TV network infrastructure, 
);;- the  Interconnection Directive,  to  ensure  transparen~y where operators have special 
and exclusive rights for  the provision of services in other sectors, and where SMP 
operators provide interconnection services to other organisations. 
Indicator: Is a suitable accounting system in place to ensure the application of  tariff 
principles and _accounting separation? 
22 Tariff  principles/accounting systems- effective application in tlae Member Stater.; 
Only France notified the Commission in due time that tariff rebalancing would not be 
completed  by  1  January  1998.  However,  since  then,  it  has  been  recognised  that 
rebalancing had  not been completed by that date in Italy, and  in Belgium that it was a 
matter for the operator and that no access deficit charges would be allowed. The Member 
States with additional periods to implement full competition were expressly, granted such 
periods by the Commission to  allow for  the necessary structural adjustments. Although 
the  deadline  for  Luxembourg has  now passed,  and is  rapidly  approaching  for  Spain, 
rebalancing does not appear to have been completed. Moreover, considerable adjustments 
are still needed in some of  the other Member States concerned. 
In  general terms, in some Member States the present tarnJII stnucture of voice telephony 
provided  by the  incumbent operator appears to  be artificial and  end-user tariffs do not 
follow  the  principle  of cost  orientation.  As  regards  specific  market  segments  (in 
particular the· local), this situation impedes competition since potential competitors have 
no  incentive to enter the relevant segment of  the voice telephony market, producing anti-
competitive effects. 
As regards leased Bil!Des tariffs, there are concerns with regard to the absence of  a dlnspute 
resolutaol!D  medumism  in  one  country  (Belgium),  and  in  several  Member States  in 
relation  to  observance of the  principle  of lllOD-dliscriminatiol!D.  Concerns  relating  to 
effective  application  of cost  ornentathm  for  leased  lines  appear  to  exist  in  several 
Member States (Belgium, Greece, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal). 
As  regards  accoununtnl!lg  systems  and!  accmmtnng  se(pl=nration  for  public  telecoms 
networks/services, although the regulatory  fr~mework appears to be in place across the 
Community except for those countries where secondary legislation is still to be adopted, 
in  several  Member States concerns in  relation to  the effectnve  appHica~noun of a sannt:arolle 
cost  accotmtorng  system  are  reported.  Certain  derogation  countries  (Spain,  Greece, 
Ireland,  Portugal) do not  have an  appropriate cost accounting system.  In  several of the 
other Member States the  operators notified as  having significant market power do  not 
have a suitable cost accounting system in  place (Belgium, Luxembourg) or the overall 
system  lacks  the transparency needed  (Germany,  France,  Austria,  Italy,  Sweden) to 
ensure the absence of cross-subsidisation and the respect of cost orientation for end-user 
tariffs or interconnection charges. In several countries the present systems appear to be 
under review (Ireland, Luxembourg). 
For a comparative overview of the fteveB. of tariffs in tUne Memlber States, see Annex 1, 
section 5. 
2.4.6.  Numbering 
EC  framework 
The provisions on numbering in the regulatory package are set out in the Interconnection 
and Full Competition Directives and in the Decisions on the single European emergency 
number (112) and on the standard international access code (00). 
23 Member  St(!.tes  are  required  to  ensure  the  availability  of adequate  numbers  and 
numbering ranges for all publicly available telecoms services. 
Indicator:  Are  operators,  particularly  mobile  operators,  squeezed  by  a  lack  of 
numbers? 
Numbering plans must be under the control of the NRAs, in order to  ensure equitable 
allocation. Allocation must be carried out in an  objective, transparent, equitable, timely 
and non-discriminatory manner. Operators, allocated ranges of  numbers must avoid undue 
discrimination  in  the  number  seq~ences used  to  provide  access  to  other  operators' 
serv1ces. 
Indicator:  Is  the  numbering plan  under the control of  a body independent of the 
incumbent/telecoms organisations? Is  the allocation of  numbers,  including special 
numbers  (such  as  free-phone),  carried  out  by  the  incumbent  or  any  other 
organisation! 
The  main  elements of national  numbering  plans  must be  published in  an  accessible 
manner. 
Indicator: Is the numbering plan still unpublished, or only partially publisfzed? 
NRAs are required to implement carrier selection on a call-by-call basis by 1 January 
1998 15  and encourage the earliest possible introduction of ummber portability, and in 
any. case to  ensure  that this  facility  is  available  by  I  January 2000.  In  the derogation 
countries this deadline is  as  soon as possible after the date of full  liberalisation, but not 
later than two years after that date. 
NRAs are also required to ensure, by 1 January 2000, that fixed network-operators with 
SM P enable their subscribers to  obtain  access  to  the  services  of other. interconnected 
service providers, by means of  preselection witliD a caU-by-call override facilfity . 
./  . 
The Decision on the singDe  Europea111  emergency number required the introduction of 
the number "112", in  parallel with any other existing national emergency call numbers. 
The Decision applies to all public telephone networks, and is supplemented by provisions 
in  the revised Voice Telephony Directive relating to  the obligation on Member States to 
ensure  that  all  users  can  access  the  emergency  services  at  no charge,  using  the  112 
dialling .code  and  any other dialling codes specified  for  use at national level.  Member 
States must also  ens~ne that emergency calls can be made free of  charge from public pay 
phones using the 112 code, without the need to use coins or cards.  · 
Indicators:  Is  the  number  available  in  all  networks,  including  mobile?  Are 
operators  able  to  deal  with  cails  in  languages  other than  those of the  country, 
region or province in which the call is made? Has the existence of  the number been 
publicised,  in  particular  in  telephone  directories  and call boxes?  Are facilities 
offered to disabled users for accessing the emergency services through the number? 
15  See Council Resolution of 22  September 1997 on the further development of a numbering policy fqr 
telecommunications services in the European Union 
24 In  assessing the overall effectiveness of the 112 emergency number, account also needs 
lo he taken of  the degree to which services dealing with emergencies can respond to calls. 
This  depends  on  the  organisational  structures  and  operational  practices  at  national, 
regional or local level and is not considered in this report16• 
The  Decision  on  the  standard  international  telephone  access  code  required  the 
introduction of the code "00". Where special arrangements are established or continued 
by  the  Member  States  for  making  calls  between  adjacent  locations  across  borders, 
subscribers must be informed. 
Indicators:  Has  the  "00" code  been  effectively  introduced,  and are subscribers 
il!formed of  special arrangements'! 
Numbering- effective application in the Member States-overview 
No  lack of numbers is reported in  any of the Member States. However, some concerns 
have been reported as to discriminatory treatment (Belgium, Luxembourg). 
The l!llumbering plan and/or allocation of  numbers is under the control of  the incumbent 
in  Greece.  Numbering  plans  have  been  published  in  most  of the  Member  States 
(Belgium,  Denmark,  Spain,  France,  Ireland,  Italy,  the  Netherlands,  Austria,  Finland, 
Sweden and United Kingdom); a new numbering plan will be published in Luxembourg 
by the end of  this year and in Italy by the end of 1999. Delays caused by the incumbent 
as regards the allocation of  numbers are reported in the Netherlands. 
Full  mnmbew  por~ability between operators in a given numbering area has so far been 
introduced  in  one  Member  State  (Finland);  it  is  already  partially  available  in  three 
Member States (Gern1any, France, and United Kingdom). The lack of number portability 
is  considered  as  one of the  main  obstacles  for  new  entrants  in  Sweden.  In  Italy  the 
di ffcrcnt time-tables for mobile and fixed telephony could be regarded as discriminatory. 
In  France  there  are  concerns  about  the  level  of interconnection  tariffs  for  number 
portability. 
Call-by-call carrier selection for long distance and/or international calls is operating in 
all of the Member States except Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg and Portugal. Carrier pre-
selection is partially available in Finland only. In some Member States, the lack of  carrier 
pre-selection  __  Is  seen  as  a  barrier  to  new  entrants  (Denmark,  Sweden  and  United 
Kingdom). 
The emergency call number 112 is operational in all countries except Greece; it is only 
partially available in  Spain.  In six Member States, however,  emergency calls may be 
addressed in one language only (Germany, France, Ireland, Austria, Portugal and United 
Kingdom). Special measures to raise the awareness of  the number have been taken in all 
16 Reference is  made in this respect to  the work of the Permanent Network of National Correspondents in 
the  field  of Civil  Protection  (PNNC),  established  under  the  Resolution  of the  Council  and  the 
Repres_entatives  of  the  Member  States  meeting  within  the  Council  of  31  October  1994  on 
strengthening Community cooperation on civil protection, OJ C 313 , 10  November 1994, p 1 
25 Member States but two (France and Austria). Specific facilities for disabled users exist in 
eight  Mcmber.States (Denmark,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands,  Finland, 
Sweden and United Kingdom).  · 
The 00 untcwna~iomul  ~access code appears to he fully applied in all  Member States except 
one (Sweden, due to a complaint to the County Administrative Court). 
For an overview of the availability of carrier selection and  number portability in the 
Membeu- States,-see Annex 1, section 4.2. 
J 
2.4. 7.  Frequency 
EC  framework 
The Community framework  on the one hand sets out rules relating to  the coordinated 
reservation  of  frequency  hand  for  GSM  (cellular  land-based  digital  mobile 
telecommunications),  ERMES  (land-based  public  radio  paging)  and  DECT  (digital 
cordless  telecornmunications),  and  on  the  other  lays  down  a  framework  relating  to 
frequency  allocation  and  the  assignment  of frequency  to  operators  in  line  with  the 
Services, Satellite and Mobile, ONP Framework and Licensing Directives and. the S-PCS 
Decision.  · 
The object of the directives is  the coordinated introduction of services on harmonised 
frequency  bands  in  order to  create  a  wide internal  market  for  land-based  and  S-PCS 
mobile communications. As to the frequency bands to be used, the confirmation of  CEPT 
allocations in Community legislation has provided increased legal certainty within the 
Community. The directives on the reservation of frequency band fixed a clear deadline 
for the allocation of core band for GSM, ERMES and DECT, and,  in the case of 
GSM and ERMES, required that plans should be prepared by the Member States for 
occupation of the "extension band" according to commercial demand. In addition, the 
Mobile  Directive  provides  that  allocation  schemes,  including  plans  for  extension of 
frequencies,  must be published every year or made available on request,  and reviewed 
regularly. 
l11dicators':  Have all relevant frequencies  been allocated! Have plans been  drawn 
up  in  the  light of  commercial demand?  Is full  o~jectivity, transpar,ency,  and non-
discrimination in the assignment of  frequency ensured? 
As regards the assignment of frequency to operators, the Mobile Directive provides that, 
subject to the availability of frequency, licences must be awarded on the basis of open, 
.non-discriminatory  and  transparent procedures.  Furthermore,  the  number of licences 
requiring  the  assignment of frequency  may be  limited only on the  basis. of essential 
requirements  and  only where related  tci  the  lack of frequency  and justified under the 
principle of  proportionality. 
l11dicators: Are licences issued in  all. cases where frequency is  available? Are the 
assignment  procedures  transparent,  non-discriminatory_ and  efficient?  Is  the 
effective use of  the frequency spectrum ensured? 
26 F,.equency- effective application in the Member States- overview 
While no lack of frequency is reported in Germany, Spain, France. Ireland and Portugal, 
in  some  Member  States  frequency  bands  for  mobiles  are  already  exhausted  (United 
Kingdom) or are expected to be exhausted in  the near future (Denmark, Ireland, Austria, 
Finland,  Sweden).  Spectrum  policy  is  not  efficient  in  relation  to  the  scarcity of this 
resource and the rapidly increasing demand for mobile systems in Italy. 
The necessary bandwidths have been reserved and  allocated to  GSM,  ERMES  and 
DECT according to the Directives in all Member States except Luxembourg. However, in 
some  Member  States  transparency  is  still  lacking  (Belgium,  Greece,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands). In some cases the time limits to phase out analogue systems seem to be too 
long to correspond to commercial demand (Denmark, Italy, Sweden). 
Frequency plans for  the future occupation of the extension band exist in most Member 
States (Belgium,  Denmark,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Austria,  Finland,  Sweden  and  United 
Kingdom). 
All  Member States have issued at  least  two  Hicences  for  GSM 900 and one licence for 
DCS-1800. In  some Member States, however, operators of DCS-1800 are still not in  the 
market (Belgium, Italy; Spain, Portugal). In some of the Member States ERMES services 
are  not  yet  provided  (Belgium,  Germany,  Spain,  Ireland,  Luxembourg,  Austria  and 
Portugal),  and  in  most of them no  DECT licence has  been requested or issued  so  far 
(Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, Portugal). In the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom, no individual licence is necessary for DECT. 
Concerns  as  regards  procedures concentrate  mainly  on  the  lack  of procedural  rules 
(Germany, Greece, Luxembourg), the split of  competences for the allocation of  frequency 
(France and Austria) or delays in the allocation of frequency (Greece as regards satellites 
and  mobile  communications;  Italy  as  regards  DCS-1800;  Spain  as  regards  satellite 
personal telecommunications services). 
2.4.8.  Rights of  way 
Under the Services Directive, Member States must not discriminate between providers of 
public telecommunications networks with regard to  the granting of rights of way;  where 
the  granting of additional  rights  of way  is  not  possible,  Member States  must  ensure 
access to existing facilities at reasonable, terms: 
In view of  concerns relating to the environment, the protection of  private property and the 
scarcity  of suitable  sites  for  instance  for  antennas  and  masts,  the  Interconnection 
Directive provides that  NRAs should encourage the  sharing of facilities,  in  particular 
where essential requirements deprive other organisations of access to viable alternatives. 
Although  the  matter  should  normally  be  resolved  through  commercial  and  technical 
agreement,  the  NRA  may  intervene  in  disputes  and  may also  impose facility-sharing 
arrangements. 
Indicators: Are there problems of  effective use of  rights of  way/collocation/sharing 
of  facilities? Are there problems with  local authorities (especially where they have 
an  interest in  telecoms service provision  e.g.  via  cable  TV)  and private property 
owners"!  Are  there  prohlems  with  the  landing  of sea  cables  and  with  IRUs 
27 (Indefeasible Rights of  Use)? 
flights of  way- effective application in  the Member States- overview 
In  all  Member States providers of public telecommunications networks arc  granted  the 
rigM to usc puhBic ways, with the exception of one, where only the incumbent and two 
other operators with  national coverage have been granted the right to  use  public ways 
over the whole territory (the Netherlands). 
However,  new  entrants  in  several  countries "encounter  practical  problems  iDll  using 
public ways.  In  three countries Jlew  entrants are not treated on the same footing as  the 
incumbent or the  utilities (Ireland, Spain) or other licensed operators (the Netherlands). 
There are cumbersome and  lengthy authorisatRoi!B  procedures in  Luxembourg. In  five 
countries  a  market  entry  barrier  is  attributable  to  procedures  at  the  level  of local 
authorities (Belgium, Spain, Germany, France, Italy). No problems have been reported by 
new  entrants  in  four  countries  (Denmark, "Finland,  Sweden,  UK).  In  three  countries 
problems have been reported in connection with the right to use private'hund, linked to 
the special powers of expropriation granted to  the incumbent (Ireland) and to practical 
difficullies with  landowners and  landlords  (Austria,  UK).  In  five  countries (Germany, 
Luxembourg,  Netherlands,  Finland,  Sweden)  new  entrants  have  not  encountered 
difficulties linked to  the use of private land.  For several countries (Belgium, Denmark, 
Greece, Spain, France, Italy; and Portugal) no  information was forthcoming with regard 
to this subject. 
The main  problem  encountered  in  relation  to  facility-sharing is  the reluctance of the 
ii1cumhcnt  to  grant  this  right  (Germany,  Ireland),  or  requirements jmposed  by  the 
incumbent that there must be existing traffic (Denmark). Only in four countries (Greece, 
Netherlands,  Finland,  Sweden)  have  new  entrants  not  encountered  problems.  For.  a 
number  Of  countries  (Belgium,  Spain,  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Portugal,  UK)  no 
information was forthcoming with regard to this subject. 
As  regards access to sea cables, there is  concern in  a number of countries. The main 
problems reported are linked to the lack of a framework for granting the right of access 
(Italy)  or· lack  of transparency  of the  framework  (Denmark,  UK),  reluctance  of the 
incumbent  to  grant  access  (Gem1any),  long  procedural  delays  and  excessive 
compensation imposed by landowners (UK). No problems have been reported in France, 
the  Netherlands,  Finland  and  Sweden.  No  information  was  forthcoming  for  Belgium, 
Greece, Spain and"Portugal. 
2.4.9.  Competiti01l in the local loop 
Where competition  in  fixed  voice telephony services has already started, new entrants, 
both facilities-based and service providers, have in many cases not entered the residential 
local  loop market. Competition and hence choice for  residential users and SMEs do not 
seem to emerge easily even if there are no regulatory barriers.  However, the market .for 
local_access to business users seems to be more competitive. This is because a number of 
issues  may  affect  the  development  of competition  in  the  local  access  network,  in 
particular for residential users and SMEs. 
28 As regards alternmattive  locaD  Doop,  the Commission has in  particular taken the initiative 
in  the :m.;a of  cahlc TV. The Services Directive as amended by the Cable Directive, now 
under  n.;view 17,  requirt:s  that  the  use  of cable  TV  JH.:Iworks  l()r  the  provision  of 
lclccornmunic1tions services should be allowt:J. The granting or licences f()r  alternative 
local  loops,  including  wirt:less,  must  be  in  line  with  the  Licensing  Directive.  In  the 
context or the establishment of wired alternative local loops, the procedures for granting 
and pricing rights of  ways are essential. 
The  provision  of unbundled  local  loop  is  specifically  envisaged  in  the  regulatory 
framework of  several Member States. Unbundling of local loop is used in those Member 
States  to  enable new entrants  to  use  the  existing subscriber line,  assuming that they 
would later have an interest in building their own once the customer base is large enough, 
taking  into  account  the  fact  that  building  a  network  is  capital  intensive  and  risky, 
especially where there is no certainty as to the potential customer base. 
The implementation by new entrants of xDSLJ8 solutions could be eased by unbundling 
of local loop. However, a recent study has warned of  possible interference between some· 
xDSL systems and  ISDN conditioned loops, and advocated a closer examination. 
lmlil'lllors: Is there some compcti/hm in the residential local loop ! 
Arc there altcmativc font! loop operators! In  particular.  arc cable TV networks 
used to fJrovide  telecoms services !  ({not,  what are the problems encountered in 
doing so !  Have wireless loca/.loop authorisations been granted? 
Is  unhundling  of the  local  loop  mandatory  at  national  level?  Are  there  any 
problems in practice ? 
An overview of  the measures taken in the Member States is given in Annex 5. 
3.  FUTURE ACTION BY THE COMMISSION 
The  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  the  effective  application  of the  national 
.measures transposing the telecommunications regulatory package, and will report further 
io the Council, European Parliament, Economic and Social Committee and Committee or 
the Regions in  JIJ<JlJ. 
The Commission will also continue to open infringement proceedings as appropriate, in 
the light of the material contained in this report, information brought to its attention and 
its ow1~ findings. 
17  Commission communication concerning the  review under competition rules of the joint provision of 
telecommunications  networks  and  cable  TV  networks  by  a  single  operator  and. the  abolition  of 
restrictions  on the  provision of cable TV  capacity  over  telecommunications  networks  (OJ  C  71,  7 
March, 1998, p4) 
IR  xDSL  is  a generic abbreviation for a range of Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) systems providing high 
speed access for customers over existing copper telephone cables in the local loop. 
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